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Abstract. The increased reliance on demand-side management policies as an urban water 
consumption management tool has stimulated considerable debate among economists, water utility 
managers, regulators, consumer interest groups and policymakers. In turn, this has fostered an 
increasing volume of literature aimed at providing best-practice estimates of price and income 
elasticities, quantifying the impact of non-price water restrictions and gauging the impact of 
nondiscretionary environmental factors affecting residential water demand. This paper provides a 
synoptic survey of empirical residential water demand analyses conducted in the last twenty-five 
years. Both model specification and estimation and the outcomes of the analyses are discussed. 
Keywords. Water demand; Demand side management; Price and income elasticity 
1. Introduction 
Water supply efficiency and demand management are increasingly important issues for 
residential water supply authorities throughout the world. Population growth, coupled with 
the reduction in freshwater supplies and the increasing cost of infrastructure, has prompted 
suppliers to place renewed emphasis on demand management through pricing structures and 
other strategies to control consumption. At the same time, the impact of global warming with 
potentially higher demands and lower supplies, and the higher values placed by the citizenry 
on environmental protection and sustainability have also had a role to play. Clearly, there is 
the need for better demand forecasting: given the real cost and value of water is now 
significantly higher, so too is the possible loss from under- or over-prediction of demand.  
Concurrently, there is ongoing debate about the competing demands of consumers and 
other stakeholders. Klawitter (2003), for example, argues that sustainable urban water pricing 
must be designed to meet, amongst others, the needs of current and future generations, 
resource use efficiency, full cost recovery (including supply costs, opportunity costs and 
economic externalities), economic viability of the water utility, and equity and fairness for 
different users. Dalhuisen et al. (2001) agree that the pricing structure should cover costs, be 
fair, induce economically efficient usage (i.e. meet the long run marginal social cost), and be 
administratively feasible. One important outcome of this debate has been a reorientation of 
public policy in that agricultural, industrial and commercial water use is not the only focus of 
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attention. With households accounting for a substantial proportion of total water supply use in 
most developed economies, residential water demand has become a principal concern of 
policymakers. 
In response, an extensive body of literature around the world has concerned itself with the 
estimation of residential water demand functions. In a multiplicity of contexts, these studies 
have analyzed a range of market and non-market systems with different tariff structures with 
an assortment of samples. Nevertheless, they share a common focus; namely, providing best-
practice estimates of price and income elasticities for designing better charging regimes, 
quantifying the impact of non-price water restrictions to judge their effectiveness in 
controlling demand, and gauging the impact of environmental factors to identify the sources 
and magnitudes of discretionary and non-discretionary water usage. They also have a focus 
on average rather than peak demand, so the literature is necessarily concerned with using 
prices to manage overall demand, rather than the different peak demands that arise on an 
hourly, daily, weekly, monthly or other seasonal basis. The resultant elasticity estimates must, 
of course, be viewed from this perspective. 
The findings from such research are not uncontentious. While economists generally agree 
that urban water prices that reflect marginal costs is a means of reducing demand during 
periods of limited water supply availability, others argue that urban water demand is 
relatively price inelastic, and therefore price is an ineffective tool for regulating demand and 
consumption. Supporters of this viewpoint suggest that more appropriate mechanisms for 
regulating water consumption are non-price strategies, encompassing public education 
campaigns, rationing, water use restrictions and subsidisation of programs aimed at adopting 
more water efficient technologies. Proponents of the alternative argue that non-price controls, 
especially water restrictions, decrease consumer welfare, increase deadweight losses, are 
inequitable and unpopular and place an unnecessary administrative burden on struggling 
public and private sector water utilities.  
2. Scope and Contribution of Survey 
At least one study, Arbues et al. (2003), has surveyed the estimation of residential water 
demand. However, few papers included in that survey were published after the late 1990s, 
and there is an emphasis placed on the earliest modeling approaches. Other possibilities 
include the meta-analyses by Espey et al. (1997) and Dalhuisen et al (2003). While these 
suffer from the usual limitations of meta-analysis – they cannot improve the quality or 
reporting of the original work, diversity is often ignored or mishandled, and the variability of 
the sample, the quality of the data, and the potential for underlying biases are not addressed – 
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they also necessarily focus on providing indicative measures of price and income elasticity, 
and are not particularly useful for researchers undertaking new work. Apart from discussing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different empirical methods, this article examines the 
steps faced by researchers as they move from a selected approach, to model specification, to 
the interpretation of results. All of this information is summarized and tabulated on a study-
by-study basis. This highlights the empirical problems that have received attention in the 
literature, and the efforts by researchers to overcome these problems. It therefore provides 
guidance to those conducting empirical research in residential water demand and is also an 
aid for policymakers, consumer interest and environmental groups, regulators, water utility 
managers and industry practitioners interpreting the outcomes of these studies. 
This review concentrates on studies published since 1980. EconLit, the Journal of 
Economic Literature electronic database, was searched to identify articles concerned with 
residential water demand estimation. References from these studies were used to identify 
other articles not included in the database. Because of this selection process, most of the 
studies are journal articles, with relatively fewer discussion, conference and project papers. 
Of the thirty-seven studies presented in Table 1 (recent examples in brackets), fifty-six 
percent are based on samples in the United States (Renwick and Green 2000; Gaudin et al. 
2001; Timmins 2002); twenty-four percent are in Europe (Nauges and Thomas 2000; 
Martinez-Espineira 2002; Nauges and Thomas 2003), sixteen percent are in Australia (Higgs 
and Worthington 2001; Hoffman et al. 2006) and the remainder in other settings. Most 
employ least squares regression techniques in some way, with the remainder using other 
techniques, including logit, generalized methods of moments, instrumental variables and 
cointegration.  
However, despite their dissimilar contexts and techniques these studies mostly share a 
common step-by-step empirical procedure that first determines the choice of estimation 
method, and second the specification of dependent and independent variables to be used in 
the selected approach.  This usually takes the form: QD = f(P, Z) where QD is the quantity of 
residential water demanded (more likely consumed), P is some measure of water price, and Z 
represents other independent variables thought to impact upon residential water demand. 
These usually include income, household structure and size, property characteristics, non-
price water restrictions and so on (Arbues et al. 2003).  
This specification is entirely generalisable in that cross-sectional, time-series or pooled 
cross-sectional and time-series (panel) data can be employed. It can also include data from 
either a sample of individual households, the whole of the residential sector where 
consumption from the population of households is summed, and in some cases, whole-of-
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utility consumption which may include some influence (and possible bias) from the presence 
of non-residential water consumption (i.e. agricultural, commercial and industrial). The 
estimated parameters of this model are the key to identifying several important economic 
relationships likely to assist demand side management policies for urban water consumption. 
First, the provision of price and income elasticities of demand to evaluate the impact on 
quantity demanded to changes in price and income. Second, the impact of non-price factors 
on both discretionary and non-discretionary urban water consumption can be ascertained. 
Finally, the level of interaction between these factors of demand can also be revealed. 
3. Tariff Metering, Structure and Billing 
A key feature of demand side management policies is the pricing structure used to apply to 
water services. Study of the effects of pricing structure can explain how effective price has 
been in regulating water consumption and thereby how successful price has been in meeting 
the multiple objectives usually taken into account when designing an optimal pricing policy. 
For the most part, the empirical researcher is likely to find that a particular tariff structure is 
already in place, perhaps for some time. And since the observations used for deriving demand 
are drawn from this context, a good knowledge of the existing tariff structure is essential for 
the purposes of model specification. Invariably, pricing structures are complex, meeting or 
attempting to meet, the varying and often competing objectives of equity, financial stability, 
simplicity, public acceptability and transparency, efficiency, the sustainability of service 
provision and profitability. For the purposes of demand estimation, three salient features need 
to be established: (i) the presence of individual household metering; (ii) the structure of prices 
representing the split between fixed and variable prices and any variance in these prices; and 
(iii) billing frequency indicating how often bills are issued to paying households for their 
water consumption.   
A variety of alternative charging methods has been employed in the past in an attempt to 
meet these criteria (Dinar and Subramanian, 1998; Bartoszczuk and Nakamori, 2004). These 
include a fixed charge invariant to the level of consumption; a fixed charge with a free 
allowance followed by some excess charge for consumption over a particular level; and, as is 
common in Australia and elsewhere, a two-part tariff consisting of a fixed component (an 
access charge) and a usage component based on the actual amount of water consumed (a 
volumetric charge). The latter can be non-linear if the cost per additional unit varies when 
consumption reaches certain thresholds. In this way, the tariff consists of a sequence of 
different marginal prices for different consumption blocks. These prices per kilolitre (or 
gallon) of water consumed can be constant (a fixed block), increasing with each successive 
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block of water use (an increasing block), or decreasing with each successive block of water 
use (a decreasing block). By far the most complex block style tariff structure reported is by 
Arbues et al (2001), who sheds light on charging practice in Zaragoza, Spain. Under the local 
water supply mechanism, there are 140 progressive pricing blocks, with the total bill charged 
at the highest block price for the period.  
Because of the overwhelming dominance of US studies of residential water demand, tariff 
structures including increasing and decreasing blocks have been well investigated. For 
example, Billings and Agthe (1980), Agthe et al. (1986), Agthe and Billings (1987), Renwick 
and Archibald (1998), Gaudin et al. (2001) have conducted analyses of increasing block 
structures, Chicoine et al. (1986) and Williams and Suh (1986) have examined decreasing 
blocks, while Foster and Beattie (1981), Schefter and David (1985), Nieswiadomy and 
Molina (1989) and Timmins (2002) have included both increasing and decreasing block 
regimes. But outside of the US there is generally less variation in side-by-side tariff 
structures. For example, increasing block rates dominate studies in Spain [see Martinez-
Espineira (2003a; 2003b) and Martinez-Espineira and Nauges (2004)], Indonesia (Rietveld et 
al. (2000) and Cyprus (Hajispyrou et al. 2002), while flat rate structures are the primary form 
in France (Nauges and Thomas 2003) and Australia [see Thomas and Symer (1988), 
Barkatulla (1996), Dandy et al. (1997), Higgs and Worthington (2001) and Hoffman et al. 
(2006)]. This reflects, of course, the permissible and established tariff structures in these 
economies, rather than any real preference by water researchers.    
In general, most of the literature on water management advocates the introduction of 
household metering (Yepes and Dianderas 1996; Dalhuisen et al. 2001; Bartoszczuk and 
Nakamori 2004; Dalhuisen and Nijkamp 2001). In fact, it has been suggested that the mere 
introduction of metering, regardless of the pricing structure used, results in a reduction in 
water use. For example, Yepes and Dianderas (1996) argue that the use of household 
metering can benefit system maintenance efforts. They found that unaccounted water 
represents around 10 to 15 percent of the water supply in high income countries, rising to 
over 50 percent in lower-income countries.  
Nevertheless, with metering the incentive to charge large volume users higher prices 
cannot be ignored. This is the most-common basis for increasing block tariffs, though the 
incentive differs between large industrial/commercial and household users and the large and 
small households as found in residential studies. Whittington (1992) argues that increasing 
block rate tariffs are welfare reducing in developing countries. Two reasons are given: first, 
many high density apartments have only one meter, so the more families per apartment, the 
greater the chance of the total metered amount reaching the highest block prices. Second, in 
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some areas of Ghana, unmetered households purchase water from neighbours or street 
vendors, with the same block rate effect. Obviously, there is little incentive for the water 
authority to invest in additional metering. Similarly, Dalhuisen and Nijkamp (2001) found 
that in developing countries household water supply is often not installed due to its high cost, 
so people buy their water from more expensive street vendors. It should also be said that 
metering in developed economies is by no means universal (including Norway, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom and Canada). In Australia, for example, many local councils and water 
supply authorities still continue to explore the costs and benefits of installing individual 
household metering, especially in apartment blocks.  
The remaining feature relates to the billing cycle. Obviously, for any given household and 
level of water consumption, billing frequency is inversely related to cost per assessment. 
While the total water charge per year is unaffected, the difference lies in smaller, more 
frequent charges as against larger, lower frequency charges. The theoretical argument is that 
households are more aware of the impact on income of large bills and these can potentially 
reduce water consumption in subsequent periods. Frequent billing also reminds consumers 
more frequently of the fact that water costs. On the other hand, less frequent billing does not 
afford the opportunity for households to quickly adjust consumption in light of these larger 
bills. In general, billing frequency is little examined because of the low level of cross-
sectional and time-series variation. For example, most local government councils in Australia 
use a 90-day billing cycle corresponding to the quarterly rates assessment and this has 
changed little in recent years. Stevens et al. (1992) is one of the few studies to expressly 
model billing frequency, but found it to be statistically insignificant influence on water 
consumption. Griffin and Chang (1990) found a similar result when they attempted to account 
for rate changes in their model. Realistically, of course, the meaningful analysis of billing 
frequency can only be made in cross-sectional studies covering a range of utilities, and the 
overwhelming emphasis of past work on time-series in a single utility indicates why so little 
is known about this particular impact. 
4. Determinants of Demand  
4.1 Pricing 
By the law of demand, residential water consumption should be inversely related to water 
price; as a commodity with few substitutes, the price elasticity of demand should also be 
inelastic. And where there is a single volumetric price (say, dollars per kilolitre), water 
demand estimation is relatively straightforward. Problematically, discontinuous tariff 
structures [that is, those that include a fixed access charge, with or without a ‘free’ water 
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allowance, and/or a decreasing or increasing volumetric rate] do not lend themselves to 
classic econometric modelling techniques.  
Consider, for example, a decreasing block rate structure where the price per unit of water 
falls as consumption increases: it is immaterial whether the price charged is ‘stepped’, with 
only a small number of decrements, or declines continuously (though the latter is clearly more 
complex). Since the marginal price varies according to consumption, this structure may 
introduce multiple price-quantity sets for a consumer tangent to their highest indifference 
curve, due to the budget line being convex to the origin. Because of this, estimates of price 
elasticity will vary (Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995). This applies not only to the case of 
multiple tariffs, but also those pricing schedules where a free allowance is involved. The latter 
effectively involves a zero price for the first block in an increasing block system. Stevens et 
al. (1992) chose to discard observations in zero price regions, while Dandy et al. (1997) used 
dummy variables to identify the presence of free water allowances. Where no free allowance 
is involved, empirical evidence indicates water consumption is positively related to the access 
charge, though its magnitude is very small [see, for instance, Hoglund (1999)]. The logical 
suggestion is higher water consumption is associated with higher costs of production and, in 
turn, higher access charges. 
To overcome the problem more generally, it was proposed that an additional price variable 
reflecting the income effect imposed by decreasing or increasing rate block structures be 
included in water demand estimations. The concept of including a second price along with the 
marginal price was first introduced by Taylor (1975) (though in the context of electricity 
pricing). Taylor (1975) suggested that a single price variable, either the average or marginal 
price, was not sufficient. This approach was further developed by Nordin (1976) who 
introduced a difference variable referred to as the ‘rate structure premium’ defined as the 
difference between the total bill less what the bill would have been if the water quantity was 
consumed at the marginal price. The hypothesis is the rate structure premium should be able 
to capture the income effects of changes in the intramarginal prices, the fixed price and the 
quantity breakpoints. Nordin’s (1976) premise was that consumers react not only to marginal 
prices, but also to the changes in consumer surplus as a result of moving from one block to 
the other, and that these intramarginal effects should be included in the demand equation. The 
difference variable in terms of consumer surplus is described as the difference in the 
consumer surplus under marginal pricing, and the consumer surplus that is actually 
experienced by a typical consumer. In case of increasing (decreasing) block tariffs the 
consumer surplus is larger (smaller) then if the units were purchased at the marginal price. 
   
WORTHINGTON AND HOFFMANN 8 
A large number of studies have specified Nordin’s difference variable as a measure of 
price, including Chicoine et al. (1986), Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986), Hewitt and 
Hanemann (1995), Barkatullah (1996), Renwick and Archibald (1998) and Martinez-Espinera 
(2003b). Chicoine et al. (1986), for example, concluded that the Nordin specification was 
largely unnecessary, recommending simple ordinary least squares (OLS) with marginal 
prices, even for block rate structures.  Barkatullah (1996) disagreed, finding that OLS and 
instrumental variable (IV) models under multi-block tariffs are supportive of the Nordin 
theory. Arbués et al (2003), however, found that while the range of elasticity values can vary 
according to how price is specified, in many cases the difference was not noticeable. Stevens 
et al. (1992) also compared the price elasticity between increasing, flat and decreasing block 
tariff systems and concluded that calculated elasticities were not statistically different across 
the various price specifications. Finally, Espey’s et al. (1997) meta-analysis concluded that 
studies using Nordin’s difference variable yielded significantly higher estimates of elasticity 
than those specifying the marginal price alone. 
Nordin’s specification remains the subject of much controversy. This is because it is 
argued that while a perfectly-informed consumer should react to marginal price and the rate 
premium (as defined Nordin-style) most consumers do not devote the time or effort to study 
the structure or the change in intramarginal rates due to information costs (Nieswiadomy and 
Molina, 1991).  Because of this, the Nordin specification (marginal price and difference) is 
argued to be significant in neither a statistical nor economic sense, though  
The essence of this argument is derived from Shin (1985). Shin (1985) suggested that the 
cause might be price illusion or incomplete information concerning the full budget constraint. 
Shin (1985) hypothesised that the coefficients of the rate structure premium and income 
variables should be equal in magnitude but opposite in sign because each measures a pure 
income effect: their coefficients in a linear demand equation should be equal. Certainly, the 
expected sign of income is positive, but the derivative of water use with respect to the 
difference is negative because increasing the intramarginal rates increases the difference and 
the implicit tax which reduces water use. To capture the pure income effect, Shin (1985) 
introduced yet another variable, the price perception variable, in addition to the marginal 
price. Shin’s (1985) price perception model showed that consumers respond to average prices 
rather than marginal prices when faced with decreasing block rate structures. In early work, 
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) used a price perception model to compare increasing and 
decreasing block tariffs and found that customers react to marginal prices when facing 
increasing block rates and average prices when faced with decreasing block rates. 
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Across the remaining literature, there is a wide variation in price specification. Williams 
and Suh (1986), Moncur (1987), Nieswiadomy (1992) and Garcia and Reynaud (2003) 
specify marginal prices while Agthe and Billings (1980), Foster and Beattie (1981), Chicoine 
et al. (1986), Barkatullah (1996), Renwick et al. (1998) and Martínez-Espiñeira  (2003b) 
adjust the marginal price with Nordin’s difference. Carver and Boland (1980) specify the real 
price (adjusted for changes in the general price level; Gaudin et al. (2001) uses the average 
price, while Chicoine et al. (1986) and Griffin and Chang (1990) subtract the marginal price 
from the average price. Finally, Hajispyrou et al. (2002) employ the marginal price in the 
highest tariff block, while Schefter and David (1985) and Martínez-Espiñeira (2003a) use an 
average marginal price. 
Certainly, the lack of variation in price elasticity estimates belies the substantial variation 
in price specification. Almost without exception, the estimated price elasticities are negative 
and inelastic (less than one), signifying the percentage reduction in the quantity of residential 
water demanded is less than proportionate to the percentage increase in price. While some 
estimates are very low – see Carver and Boland (1980), Thomas and Syme (1988), 
Barkatullah (1996), Renwick et al. (1998) and Martinez-Espinera and Nauges (2004) for price 
elasticities less than 0.25 – many more lie in the range of 0.25 to 0.75 – see Agthe and 
Billings (1980), Chicoine et al. (1986), Williams and Suh (1986), Nieswiadomy and Molina 
(1989),  Nieswiadomy (1992), Pint (1999), Gaudin et al. (2001), Martinez-Espineira (2003a).     
Reasons for the empirical variation in price elasticity estimates remain elusive. Espey’s et 
al (1997) rather-dated meta-analysis at least removes some possible contenders: there is no 
significant difference between estimates from linear and log-linear models or least squares 
and other estimation techniques; and it appears to matter little if the sample uses household or 
aggregate (i.e. aggregated households, not aggregated industrial, commercial, agricultural and 
household users) data or specifies cross-sectional or time-series daily, monthly, quarterly or 
annual consumption. More likely prospects concern the failure of many studies to take into 
account market timing. For example, long-run price elasticity estimates are invariably more 
elastic than short run estimates [Agthe and Billings 1980; Carver and Boland 1980; Agthe et 
al 1986; Moncur 1987; Dandy et al. 1997; Martinez-Espinera 2003b; Nauges and Thomas 
(2003)] and winter price elasticity is less elastic then summer price elasticity (Dandy et al. 
1997; Pint 1999; Gaudin et al. 2001). As justification, Arbués et al. (2003) suggest that long-
run price responsiveness is likely to be greater due to the capital investment required by 
consumers to purchase water efficient appliances such as toilets, taps, showers and washing 
machines. Likewise, an estimate of price elasticity at the means can vary where there is 
income heterogeneity. For instance, Agthe and Billings (1987), Thomas and Syme (1988), 
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Renwick and Archibald (1998) have concluded that the price elasticity of residential water 
demand is lower for low income households than middle and high income households. The 
other possibility is that because non-discretionary (or necessity) demands have a lower price 
elasticity than discretionary (or luxury) demands, the lower proportion of discretionary 
demands in low-income households infers lower price elasticities.   
4.2. Income 
For normal goods, demand should increase proportionately with income. With water, the 
measurement of income effects on consumption is important, because water bills often 
represent a lower proportion of income for higher-income households (Arbués et al. 2003). In 
studies based on whole-of-utility data, income is normally per capita or per household, 
whereas in household-based studies actual household income (or a proxy such as housing 
value) can be employed. A further consideration is that income, through its correlation with 
education, may be reflective of water conservation measures taken by the household itself 
through the purchase of water-conserving appliances and planting of drought-tolerant garden 
vegetation. In addition, since income can approximate wealth, income (from taxation, census 
and survey data) can also be used to proxy other normal and luxury goods associated with 
household water consumption where data may not be as easily obtainable, including 
swimming pools and spas, in-ground garden irrigation systems, and dishwashing machines.  
Estimates of income elasticity in the literature are almost universally income inelastic (less 
than one) and small in magnitude [see, for instance, Chicoine et al. (1986), Moncur (1987), 
Thomas and Symer (1988), Barkatullah (1996), Dandy et al. (1997), Gaudin et al. (2001), 
Garcia and Reynaud (2003). This appears consistent with the strong likelihood that the 
income elasticity of residential water demand is indeed low. But there is also the possibility 
that sample or specification bias may have a role to play. For example, few studies sample 
very income-diverse populations: the income elasticity of water demand would be higher with 
more variation in household income, say, between households in developing and developed 
economies. In addition, there is the aforementioned complication that increasing and 
decreasing block rates potentially encompass income effects. This may also serve to reduce 
the significance and magnitude of income effects. A final consideration is that the estimated 
income elasticities are short-run. Income-related activities like buying new appliances, 
moving house and house extensions, for example, that affect water demand, may only be 
possible  over the longer term, so a more complex model allowing for this longer-run 
transition may be appropriate.   
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4.3. Weather and seasonal factors 
Household water demand comprises two main components: discretionary and non-
discretionary demand. Discretionary water use is normally defined as that used for watering 
lawns and gardens, swimming pools, washing cars and other forms of outdoor cleaning, but 
can also include inside use like power showers (where a pump is used to boost the flow rate), 
spas and other luxury uses. Non-discretionary water use then refers to water used for basic 
needs such as drinking, cooking and personal hygiene, including laundering, bathing and 
toilet flushing. For this reason, discretionary water use is regarded as being more price 
responsive than non-discretionary water use, and as it is largely employed outside, more 
influenced by weather and other seasonal factors.   
As a rule, residential water use is usually shown to be highly sensitive to seasonal 
fluctuations. For example, Maidment and Miaou (1986) examined daily water use in nine US 
cities using a physics-type transfer function excluding price and income effects. They found 
that the response to rainfall depended first on its occurrence, and then on its magnitude, and 
that there is a non-linear response of water use to temperature changes: with no response for 
daily maximum air temperatures between 4-21oC and an increase in water use with 
temperatures above 21oC. Further, water demand was hardly affected as consumption 
approached a subsistence level.  
Weather and other seasonal factors have been specified in a number of ways. These range 
from temperature (Griffin and Chang 1990), minutes of sunshine, precipitation, rainfall, 
temperature and rainfall (Stevens et al. (1992), the number of rainy days (Hoffman et al. 
(2006), and even the evapo-transpiration rate of Bermuda grass less rainfall (Billings and 
Agthe 1980, Agthe et al. 1986, Nieswiadomy and Molina 1989 and Hewitt and Hanemann 
1995). If the data frequency is at least semi-annual, the possibility also exists for seasonal 
variation, and dummy variables are generally used to control for summer and winter 
consumption. Without exception, summer price elasticities are lower than winter price 
elasticities, indicating that it is discretionary water that is most affected by behavioural 
changes. 
Nonetheless, there has been some criticism surrounding the specification of weather 
parameters. Maidment and Miaou (1986) argue that the linear relationship assumed between 
the proxy for weather, such as rainfall, and the focus of measurement often breaks down. For 
example, the impact of rainfall diminishes over time and the effect is greater with higher 
levels of water use prior to rain. Likewise, Martínez-Espiñeira (2002) suggests that the mere 
occurrence of rain has a psychological impact, and so the number of rainy days rather than the 
amount of rain has a greater impact on water demand. Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges (2004) 
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also found that water demand is minimally affected by weather as consumption approaches 
some base (non-discretionary) level of use. Finally, in their meta-analysis, Espey et al (1997) 
and Dalhuisen et al. (2003) argued that the incorporation of rainfall results in significantly 
less elastic estimates of the price elasticity of demand. At first sight this would suggest some 
rainfall and prices are positively related, lying at odds with the notion that prices should be set 
with scarcity in mind.   
4.4 Population and household composition 
If the dependent variable is defined as water usage per household, household size should be 
positively associated with water use. However, not all studies have included household size, 
even when considering average household water consumption (Agthe and Billings 1980; 
Nieswiadomy 1992). Accordingly, there is remarkably little empirical evidence on scale 
economies in water consumption, though the evidence that does exist is very strong. Arbués 
et al. (2000), for example, found that the increase in water use is often less than proportional 
to the increase in household size or population. They postulated that an increase in the 
number of households, with population held constant, would lead to an increase in the total 
water demand in an area. In the same way, an increase in population in inner city and other 
densely populated areas is unlikely to be associated with an increase in consumption due to 
smaller housing lots, smaller gardens, and a higher predominance of flats and units. However, 
in countries where garden-related use is not strong, the extra in-house use (washing, bathing, 
etc.) would tend to dominate.  
A further consideration is household composition. Nauges and Thomas (2000), for 
example, argued that water consumption in areas with a higher proportion of younger persons 
is likely to be higher due to more frequent laundering and use of water-intensive outdoor 
leisure activities. However, communities with a higher proportion of older inhabitants may be 
more focused on gardening. Martinez-Espineira (2003a), for instance, included variables 
reflecting both the proportion of the population over 64 years and those under 19 years. In 
addition, people from different cultural backgrounds may be more or less reactive to the price 
of water. Griffin and Chang (1990) and Gaudin et al. (2001) specified the percentage of the 
population of Spanish origin as a determinant in their study of water consumption in Texas.  
4.5 Non-price consumption controls 
In terms of demand-side management policies, a number of non-price controls on 
consumption are possible. These can include prohibitions and restrictions on the watering of 
gardens, filling of swimming pools, car washing and path and building cleaning. However, 
they also include appeals for water conservation and education campaigns aimed at limiting 
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water use. Because of the ubiquitous nature of these policies and their possible interaction 
with other variables, especially pricing, there is the requirement to include some specification 
in analyses of water demand and consumption (Syme et al. 2000). Renwick, et al. (1998), for 
instance, argue that the clear definition of all relevant policy variables is important for 
accurate measurement since the nature of the policies used may vary either through time or 
cross-sectionally.  
Syme et al. (2000) have argued that the possible interactions of non-price campaigns with 
other policy instruments make it difficult to evaluate their effectiveness.  Statistical studies 
using regression have problems with multicollinearity among the variables.  Interpretation is 
also a problem, possibly due to unmeasured exogenous variables; for example, a marketing 
campaign may heighten the motivation to respond to the pricing schedule. Interestingly, while 
feedback information on usage has been shown to reduce energy consumption, it appears to 
make little difference to water consumption. Possible causes given are: ineffective 
conservation methods, water saving is more difficult, water is too cheap to worry about and a 
lack of motivation to save (Thomas and Syme, 1988). 
5. Data and Sampling Frequency 
The availability (or rather acute lack) of accurate data at an appropriate frequency has plagued 
attempts at modelling residential water demand. In theory, estimating residential water 
demand functions with household level data would be the most valuable, especially 
consistently over time. But while many researchers advocate the use of household level 
surveys to specifically identify and measure all relevant household characteristics, only a few 
have actually been conducted, comprising Foster and Beattie (1981), Nieswiadomy (1992), 
Nieswiadomy and Cobb (1993), Higgs and Worthington (2001), Arbues et al. (2001), and 
Hajispyrou et al. (2002). As an alternative, Rizaiza (1991) and Renwick and Archibald (1998) 
used stratified random sampling of surveys.  
The lack of data availability may help explain the high rate of data re-use from previously 
published work. For example, the 1974-1980 data for Tucson, Arizona first used in Agthe and 
Billings (1980) was later specified in Billings and Agthe (1980), Agthe et al. (1986) and 
Agthe and Billings (1987), while a 1976-1985 Denton, Texas dataset was repeatedly 
employed in Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989; 1991), Griffin and Chang (1990), Hewitt and 
Hanemann (1995) and Gaudin et al. (2001). This is problematic in that much of an apparently 
broad literature is, in reality, reliant on only a few unique datasets. That said, and as shown in 
Table 1, the estimates are generally consistent, despite the dissimilar approaches, and this 
yields some insight into the relatively (low) impact of specification change. At the same time, 
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the cost of gathering information means that many other studies rely on rather-dated 
information. For example, Carver and Boland (1980) specified a 1969-1974 Washington 
panel, Foster and Beattie (1981) used a US cross-section from 1960, Moncur (1987) 
examined a 1975-1981 Hawaiian panel, and Timmins (2002) used a 1970-1993 Californian 
panel. Given the rapid change in charging regimes and conditions, these studies may not have 
much to offer contemporary policymakers and utility managers.  
Outside of the household-level surveys, most existing research has focused instead on 
aggregated mains, community or utility-level data [see, for example, Thomas and Syme 
(1988), Stevens et al. (1992), Nieswiadomy and Cobb (1993), Barkatullah (1996), Timmins 
(2002)]. However, this brings additional complications. One concerns the need for matching 
average water consumption with the averages of other demand-related characteristics, often 
from different sources with different frequencies. These potentially include household 
income, household size, household demographics, etc. The more substantive complication is 
the apparent inconsistency between non-price demand factors and the quantity demanded 
being expressed in averages, while water prices are almost always in marginal terms. Schefter 
and David (1985) argued that on this basis, the more accurate price measures are the mean 
marginal price and the mean (Nordin) difference (emphasis added). 
Pooled time-series, cross-sectional (or panel data) techniques have dominated the literature 
[see, for instance, Agthe and Billings (1980), Chicoine and Ramamurthy (1986), Hewitt and 
Hanemann (1995), Dandy et al. (1997), Gaudin et al. (2001), Martinez-Espineira (2003a)]. 
But while the stability of estimates and the increasing degrees of freedom offered by panel 
data are well known, most of these are unbalanced panels of aggregated communities and 
utilities, with none following specific households over time. Cross-sectional techniques are 
the next most popular [see Foster and Beattie (1981), Chicoine et al. (1986), Martin and 
Thomas (1986), Stevens et al. (1992), Rietveld et al. (2000) and Hajispyrou et al. (2002). 
And not surprisingly given the difficulty in gather accurate and consistent data, time series 
techniques have not been well used. Further, there is little evidence of application of some of 
the more advanced time-series techniques [for an exception see Martinez-Espinera (2003)].  
The question also arises as to how these studies treat periods when demands exceed 
supplies, such as droughts, and cannot be completely satisfied. For the most part, the literature 
includes these periods and relies on factors such as rainfall and water restrictions to quantify 
these impacts. The alternative, excluding periods when supplies actually meet demands, is not 
found and the implication is that some misspecification in the estimation of the parameters 
may result.  
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6. Estimation Techniques 
The existing literature on the estimation of the water demand models involves numerous 
econometric techniques. For cross-sectional data, the empirical techniques employed include 
ordinary least squares (OLS), generalised least squares (GLS), two and three-stage least 
squares (2SLS and 3SLS), logit and instrumental variables (IV). In terms of time series data, 
vector autoregressive (VAR) models and cointegration techniques could also be potentially 
used, however the only known water demand study to do so is Martínez-Espiñeira (2003b). 
Lastly, many techniques normally reserved for cross-sectiosn are equally applicable to pooled 
time-series, cross-sectional (or panel) data, including OLS, GLS, maximum-likelihood (ML) 
and 2SLS. 
That said ordinary least squares methods dominate the water demand literature (Billings 
and Agthe 1980; Chicoine et al 1986; Hewitt and Hanemann 1995; Higgs and Worthington 
2001 and Martínez-Espiñeira 2003a). But one particular problem when using data with block 
rate pricing is simultaneity: that is, when consumers select the quantity of water to be 
demanded, they also select the price. Since the price of water both determines and is 
determined by consumption, OLS estimation of block rate pricing models may yield biased 
and inconsistent estimates. Since there is a need to find a proxy for the stochastic variable 
price, several IV techniques have been suggested.  
Nieswiadomy and Molina (1991) focus on two common approaches. The first introduces a 
separate price equation in a two stage least squares (2SLS) procedure. In the first stage, the 
observed price is regressed against all explanatory variables during the increasing block-
pricing period. The predicted price is then specified in the second stage as a regressor. 
Nieswiadomy and Molina’s (1991) second approach involves the regression of the observed 
water demand on the actual price that the household faces at different levels of water demand. 
In the second stage, the predicted quantity demanded and the actual rate schedule is used to 
obtain a predicted price (Agthe et al 1986; Agthe and Billings 1987; Barkatullah 1996; Hewitt 
and Hanemann 1995 and Higgs and Worthington 2001). Regardless, both techniques are 
likely to improve the reliability of estimates.   
Within the many other techniques, a variety of functional forms have been employed, 
some with allowance for non-linearity in the underlying consumption technologies. While 
linear demand functions are easy to estimate, there is the implication that the change in 
quantity demanded in response to a price change is the same at every price level. Another 
form, the Cobb-Douglas function, is synonymous with the non-linear log-log (or double-log) 
model. One of the well-known properties of Cobb-Douglas is that the estimated slope 
coefficient represents the (partial) elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the 
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independent variable, holding all other independent variables constant. This removes the 
necessity of calculating partial elasticities at the means, as with linear functions. Cobb-
Douglas water demand equations are widely used in the literature, including Foster and 
Beattie (1981), Nieswiadomy and Cobb (1993), Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) and Garcia and 
Reynaud (2004). Alternatively, Gaudin et al. (2001) and Martínez-Espiñeira and Nauges 
(2004) have employed the alternative Stone-Geary utility function, which is also non-linear, 
though log-lin. The main advantage of this form is that it can incorporate some minimum 
amount of water demand, irrespective of prices. This subsistence level may be made 
dependent on the evolution of consumer habits and stock of physical capital, in such a way 
that its size varies with time.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
The primary focus of residential water demand modelling has been on obtaining consistent, 
reliable and useful measures of the price (and to a lesser extent, income) elasticity of demand. 
Price elasticity estimates are generally found in the range of zero to 0.5 in the short-run and 
0.5 to unity in the long-run: income elasticity estimates are of a much smaller magnitude 
(usually) and positive. The income elasticity of residential water may well be low; sample or 
specification bias, however, may also be important. For instance, the income effects as 
measured may be mixed up with price effects in poorly specified models or the elasticities are 
really only valid in the short term, and may be substantially more elastic over the longer term.  
Further, price elasticities are higher in the summer than the winter, and this is perhaps a 
reflection of the differing impact of pricing on discretionary water use that is usually, but not 
always, related to outside activities. The demand for water has also been shown to vary with 
seasonal factors, household composition, and the imposition of water restrictions. Aggregate 
and household level data have been shown to yield similar results and there appears to be no 
statistically significant difference internationally in the price and income elasticities. These 
are the least contentious aspects of this area of research. 
A more contentious aspect concerns price specification, of which two dimensions have 
been recognized. First, most water tariffs have complex structures that combine fixed and 
variable charges. Because of this, there is a division placed between marginal and average 
prices and consumers’ reaction to these prices will then depend on price perception. Second, 
an additional complication arises where modelling techniques are required to compensate for 
the (potential) income effect of variable block tariffs. Simultaneity is the basic issue, as 
consumers choose quantity-price pairs: that is, decisions on quantity determine prices. But 
specification is only part of the story. The most fundamental limitation in this area is the lack 
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of data concerning households and their demands for water. Only with consistent and specific 
information collected over relatively long periods of time in a variety of jurisdictions will it 
be possible to definitively model the many influences on residential water consumption as an 
input into residential water policy. 
Certainly, there is an urgent, even dire, need for empirical work in this area. Consider 
Australia where there is growing disquiet that the worst drought since 1788 and record high 
temperatures are not part of some natural cycle, rather the longer realignment in rainfall and 
temperature caused by global warming. With reservoirs in nearly all state capitals at critically 
low levels, a lack of essential infrastructure, consideration of desalination plants and effluent 
recycling plants, and the reallocation of water allocations from agriculture to urban use 
already taking place, residential water demand management appears the only short-term 
solution. Patently, good water demand modelling is the key to good water policymaking. 
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TABLE 1. Empirical Analyses of Residential Water Demand 
Author(s) Data Sample Pricing structure 
Dependent 



















Marginal price, difference price, evaporation 










Linear model elasticities 











Marginal price (nominal and real), difference 
term, implicit marginal sewer charge during 
winter months, personal income, 
evapotranspiration less rainfall 
OLS 0.27-0.49 n.a. Real monetary values produce 
substantially stronger 
statistical results than 











divided by the 
number of 
connections. 
Real income, real price, average number of 
residences per connection, average number of 






n.a. When separated into seasonal 
and non-seasonal components, 
elasticities are substantially 















Marginal price, difference price, median 
household income, precipitation, average 
number of residents per meter. 
OLS 0.12 0.58 Results of a Nordin-type 
marginal price model suggest 
average price is a better 
















Mean marginal price  estimated using the 
combined water and sewer tariffs, mean 
difference  using the combined water and 
sewer tariffs, average household income; 
OLS n.a. n.a. Given aggregate data, mean 
marginal price and mean price 















Price index for other relevant goods, income, 
Nordin’s difference (rate premium), marginal 
price, average price less marginal price. 
OLS, 2SLS 
and 3SLS 
0.22-0.42 0.01-0.14 3SLS estimates slightly more 
efficient compared to 2SLS 














Marginal price, rate structure premium, 
evaporation rate of Bermuda grass less 
rainfall, household income. 





n.a. Demand is significantly more 
elastic in long run than in short 
run. 
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Author(s) Data Sample Pricing structure 
Dependent 























Mean daily per 
capita water 
consumption.  





0.50 n.a. Precise estimates of demand 
elasticities may not be 
necessary for policy purposes. 
Short-run elasticities give little 













customer class  
Marginal price, average revenue price, other 
price measures, size of customer class, per 
capita income, total rainfall recorded in the 
summer months, average temperature in the 






Price elasticities larger for 
average revenue price 
specifications than for 




Panel. Illinois,   
1983. 
Decreasing 




Average price decomposed into a marginal 
price, monthly income less the effects of the 
block rate structure (Nordin), number of 
persons in household, number of bath rooms, 
dummies for month. 
OLS n.a. n.a. The marginal price or average 
price are, by themselves, 
inadequate in explaining 
consumption demand for rural 













Lagged consumption, marginal price, income 
per household member, rainfall household 





0.04-0.08 A conservation program can 
bolster price elasticity. During 
a drought, price elasticity 












Marginal price, difference price, evaporation 
rate of Bermuda grass less rainfall, household 
income, presence of swimming pool, type of 












n.a. Substantial increase in water 















Marginal price, difference variable, average 
household income, annual precipitation, 
restrictions on public water supply use, hours, 
average household size, percentage of 









0.20-0.22 Contingent valuation approach 
appears to be reliable and 
applicable where the available 
data do not favour regression 
analysis. 
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Author(s) Data Sample Pricing structure 
Dependent 




















One-month lagged water consumption, 
monthly income (based on house value), 
marginal block price, ratio of lagged average 
monthly price to current marginal price, 
irrigable land, weather (based on 
evapotranspiration of Bermuda grass less 
precipitation). 




0.14-0.15  Significant price effects with 
decreasing and increasing 
block rates.  
Consumers react to average 
price under decreasing block 















per household  
Average price of water plus sewerage, 
average annual income per capita, population 
density, average annual precipitation, average 
annual temperature, billing frequency, 
dummy variable for location of community, 
dummies for pricing regime. 
OLS and 
2SLS 











Elasticities are not statistically 
different between different 
















Minimum charge, average price, marginal 
price, Shin’s price (perception price), income, 
dummies for conservation and education 
programs, regions, average monthly rainfall 
and temperature. 
OLS n.a. n.a. Conservation does not appear 
to reduce water use. 
Consumers react more to 
average rather than marginal 












Water use per 
household per 
month 
Marginal price, average price, public 
education, number of persons per household, 
percentage of home built before 1939, 
percentage of homes that are owner-
occupied, average rainfall per month and 
average temperature between last spring 















Households react to average 
prices under both decreasing 
and increasing block 













Lawn size, weather, number of bathrooms, 
house size, price, income (modified for 




1.57-1.63 0.15-0.16 Comparison of OLS, IV and 
2SLS regressions using 
summer component. Reason 
for high values may be 
summer only data.   
Barkatullah 
(1996) 









Nordin-difference variable, marginal price, 
average temperature, lagged rainfall, income, 
property value, peak/off-peak dummy, 
household size, number of bedrooms and 




0.21 0.07 OLS provides biased and 
inefficient estimates. 
Consumers respond to 
marginal prices when faced 
with multi-part tariffs. 
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Author(s) Data Sample Pricing structure 
Dependent 




















Quantity of water consumed in the previous 
year, annual allowance, dummy variables for 
consumption in excess of allocation, property 
























Free water allowance results in 
wastage and that its removal 
would be an efficient way of 
reducing water consumption. 
Little equity impact through 














Alternative non-price demand management 
policies, marginal price, difference term, 
income, lot size, precipitation (difference 




0.16-0.20  n.a. Failure to account for the 
influence of non-price demand 
side management policies may 
result in an overestimate of the 











Marginal price of water, Nordin difference, 
policy dummies for restriction, allocation and 
rebates on water saving technology, adoption 
of water saving technologies, gross monthly 
household income, number of household 
members, housing density, number of 













0.36  Higher water prices are 
expected to directly reduce 
demand in the short run and 
stimulate the demand for water 
efficient technologies by 
increasing the relative benefits 
associated with adoption in the 
medium to long run. 
Pint (1999) Panel. Alameda, 






water use as a 
deviation from 
average use 
House size, lot size, precipitation, lagged 
precipitation, temperature and lagged 








n.a. Maximum likelihood models 
that explicitly consider the 
household’s response to the 
rate structure result in 













per person per 
day. 
Marginal price of water, fixed price for 
typical household, average price, gross 
household income, average household size, 









0.07-0.13 Strong regional variation in 
household consumption, 
significant scale economies in 
household water consumption. 
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Author(s) Data Sample Pricing structure 
Dependent 




















Marginal price of water, “virtual income” to 
account for lower infra-marginal price paid 
for the first allocation of water, household 
size, and availability of non-piped water. 
OLS 1.28-1.16  n.a. Demand depends on household 
size and presence of 












per capita per 
month 
Average price, per capita income, proportion 
of population of Spanish origin, climate, 








0.24 to 0.27 
0.11-0.19 Results suggest that 
approximately ¾ of total water 






















Household income, value of property, 
marginal price under the user-pays system, 
seasonal dummy, number of household 
members, other house characteristics, and 
soil characteristic. 
IV and Logit n.a. n.a. Because of uncertainty 
associated with future 
household water demand, the 
option to remain on the non-
user pays system has value and 



















Average temperature, population density, 
household size, fixed component of water 
and sewerage bill, billing period, income 
index, marginal price, population over 64 
years and under 19 year, precipitation, 
percentage of housing as main residence 
dwelling, tourism index, Nordin-difference. 
IV 0.12-0.17 n.a. Significant difference in 
summer-only elasticities and 
major impact of climatic 















Typical rate structure consists of three 
components: (i) a service charge (ii) some 
quantity of water and (iii) marginal rate 
charge for each additional acre foot of water 
consumed, annual rainfall, number of active 




n.a. n.a. Municipal water 
administrators charge below 
marginal cost and in so doing 
inefficiently exploit aquifer 
stocks and induce social 
surplus losses.  
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Author(s) Data Sample Pricing structure 
Dependent 



















Marginal price (highest tariff block in cubic 
meter), income, number of adults, children 
washing machine, dish washer, square meters 
of dwelling, toilets outside and inside, 
running water, household head employed in 
agriculture, household head retired, sewage 
system,  
ML n.a. n.a. Large families are at a 
disadvantage under increasing 
block rates because they face a 
higher marginal price of water 
than small families at the same 















Income index per capita, percentage of 
population under the age of 19 years, 
percentage of population over 64 years, the 
average temperature in each month, mean 






0.37-0.67 n.a. Nordin’s specification using 
aggregate data acompared to 
average marginal price and 
average difference. Price 






France,   
1995-1998. 
Flat rate. Annual water 
consumption 
per water utility 
Marginal price, average taxable income per 
household, number of dependents per 
household, proportion of housing equipped 
with a bath or toilet, proportion of industrial 
users, summer rainfall, proportion of houses 
built after 1982.  
GMM 0.25 0.03 Consistent and efficient 
econometric method is used to 
estimate supply-demand 















Marginal price of water (adjusted for multi-
part tariff structure), virtual income (the 
difference average salaries and the Nordin-
difference), rainfall, average maximum daily 
temperature, number of daily hours of 










n.a. Engle-Granger and Wickens-
Breusch ECMs provide similar 




Panel France,   
1988-1993. 
Flat rate. Average annual 
water 
consumption  
Lagged demand, price (at the beginning of 




run 0.40  
0.51 Local authorities should refer 
to long run elasticities when 
assessing the impact of tariff 














Marginal price of water (adjusted for multi-
part tariff structure), virtual income (the 
difference average salaries and the Nordin-
difference), rainfall, population, number of 
daily hours of restrictions, outdoor use bans. 
OLS and 
GLS 
0.07–0.13  0.07-0.13 
 
Once price insensitive 
threshold is reached, 
information campaigns or 
promotion of low-water using 
equipment is more effective in 
reducing consumption than an 
increase in price. 
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Author(s) Data Sample Pricing structure 
Dependent 






















Marginal price of water, household income 
and size, number of rainy and warm days in 




0.23 Price and income elasticity 
higher in owner-occupied 
households than renter 
households. Summer and rainy 
days exert strong influence on 















Average price of water, per capita income, 
average number of household members, 
population density, average annual 
precipitation, number of high temperature 
days. 
OLS, 2SLS 0.37 0.30 Price information on water 
bills has a significant positive 
influence on elasticity. 
Notes: OLS – Ordinary Least Squares, 2SLS – Two-stage Least Squares, 3SLS – Three-stage Least Squares, IV – Instrumental Variables, SE – Systems Equations, ML – Maximum Likelihood, GLS – 
Generalised Least Sqaures, GMM – Generalised Method of Moments, ECM – Error Correction Model, n.a – not applicable or not calculated.  
 
 
